This note sketches out a refactor of the interfaces and calls between the miner, market and FIL+ registry actors in order to support alternative storage markets.

This draft is replaced by Architecture for programmable storage markets – v2

<aside> 💡 The canonical version is now in FIPs 👇

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An architecture for programmable storage markets · Discussion #298 · filecoin-project/FIPs

Goals

• Break any dependency of the miner actor on the market
• Break coupling between the market and FIL+ actors
• Don’t trust the market actor for anything except maintaining its own internal deal state
• Thus allow an alternative storage market to compete with the built-in one, including for FIL+ deals
• Retain the current economic structure, incentives, pledge etc
• Be compatible with future change to ‣

Supporting alternative markets also requires Miner market registrations for market fault processing. See also Market/deal contract interfaces notes for other programmability enhancements.

Questions to check if this is a good architecture

• Could this work with an L2 market? How?
• Could we even further remove knowledge of deals from the miner actor, so they don’t even pass through?
  • Would like to notify market of sector content async, after PoRep.
  • Challenge is associating piece CIDs with CommD when the CommD is proven to be correct, i.e. only at PoRep time
• Could we get features of deal extension after this re-architecture, even while FIL+ remains? (Maybe with FIL+ Forever)
  • Deals decoupled from FIL+, so non-verified deals are easy
  • Need extension of data cap
• Could we add feature of upgrading a deal to FIL+ after it starts?
  • 2/3 of the way there, need a new method on miner to claim data cap after PoRep
  • And the challenge of proving piece inclusion in CommR again :-(